Fraud - No Constructive Notice in Fraud Cases by Evans, William
Marquette Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 1 Summer 1945 Article 9
Fraud - No Constructive Notice in Fraud Cases
William Evans
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
William Evans, Fraud - No Constructive Notice in Fraud Cases, 29 Marq. L. Rev. 68 (1945).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol29/iss1/9
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
at the time of the original transaction was that title was to vest in the
Bank of California, National Association when credit with right to
withdraw was given to Richardson and Richardson.
CORDULA M. SCHOMMER.
Fraud-No Constructive Notice in Fraud Cases.-Schoedel v.
State Bank of Newburg, 245 Wis. 74, 13 N. W. (2d) 534 (1944), was
an action commenced on May 10, 1937, by the plaintiff against the
defendant bank to recover damages arising out of the alleged false
and fraudulent representation by defendant that a certain mortgage
sold to plaintiff by defendant on March 16, 1931, was a first mortgage
on the real estate therein described.
According to the allegations of the complaint the mortgage sold was
in fact a second mortgage junior to a first mortgage recorded April 15,
1929, but the plaintiff knew nothing of this first mortgage until May
10, 1937, when the summons and complaint in a suit to foreclose the
first mortgage was served upon him. The defendant demurred to the
complaint on the ground that the action was not commenced within
six years of accrual of the cause of action under Section 330.19 (7)
of the Wisconsin Statutes, providing that in an action for relief on
ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of facts constituting the
fraud. The trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant ap-
pealed contending that the plaintiff as assignee of the mortgage, was
charged with notice of the recorded facts establishing the legal position
of his mortgage and that the plaintiff, having constructive notice of
matters of record which disclosed the falsity of the representations,
must be deemed to have discovered the fraud at the time when he
purchased the mortgage on March 16, 1931, and that therefore his pres-
ent action was too late.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that under the above
statute plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until actual discovery
of the fraud on May 10, 1937, and that the doctrine of constructive
notice was inapplicable under the statute.
The decision is an application of the general doctrine of justifiable
reliance in business transactions upon representation of fact to record-
ed facts. The matter is well put in the Restatement of Torts:' "The
recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of
fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have ascer-
tained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation."
1 Restatement of Torts, Sec. 540.
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RECENT DECISIONS
Comment b. "The rule stated in this section is applicable even
though the fact which is falsely represented is required to be recorded
and is recorded."
A recent Wisconsin case following the rule as laid down by the
American Law Institute in the Restatement of Tort is Frank v. State
ex rel of Meirers.2 In this case the court held that a misrepresentation
that premises are presently unincumbered and eligible for a first mort-
gage is a representation of fact -and will support a prosecution for
obtaining money under false pretenses even though resort to offices of
record would disclose the true title of the property.
The authorities are not in agreement on the issue as raised in the
principal case. Some holding that recorded instruments are constructive
notice for the purpose of the Statute of Limitation.3
Those authorities which have, at times laid this down as a prin-
ciple have experienced some difficulty in adhering to it, because it is
a rule of thumb, rather than a live principle of law, and it takes no
account of the numerous forms in which fraud may appear and its
varied devices and circumstances of concealment.
The decision in the principal case is sound as pointed out by the
court, if a person to whom the representation is made that the property
is unincumbered or that the mortgage is a first mortgage is deemed to
have discovered the fraud by reason of the record, then he must be
deemed to have discovered it at the time the representations were made
and there would be no occasion for dealing with the Statute of Limi-
tation at all. Again as said in the Restatement of Torts,' "The recording
acts are not intended as a protection to those who made fraudulent
representations. Their purpose is to afford a protection to persons who
buy a recorded title against those who having obtained a paper title
2 Frank v. State ex rel. of Meirers, 244 Wis. 658, 12 N.W. (2d) 923 (1944).
3137 A.L.R. 268.
33 A.L.R. 853.
Annotated Cases 1917 A. 269.
Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. (2d) 423, 106 Pac. (2d) 423, (1940). Here in a
suit by the minority stockholders to recover property belonging to the corpora-
tion on the ground that a director fraudulently acquired its title was barred
by a three year statute of limitation. It was held that a judgment rendered in
a previous case against the corporation and in favor of the director (defend-
ant) was constructive notice to the plaintiff, here, of the director's alleged
fraud.
Isaiah Walker Jr. v. Harvey Soule, 138 Mass. (1884). In tort action to recover
money paid to Defendant administrator, for conveyance of certain property
which was already disposed of and which conveyance was properly recorded,
the Court held: The only false representations were as to the contents of
public records, which the plaintiff had full opportunity to examine.
Heap v. Heap, 258 Mich. 250, 242 N.W. 252 (1932). In a bill for an accounting
of an estate, in which petitioner, widow of the intestate, claims fraud of the
administrator, in estate's interest in a partnership, the Court held: the general
rule to be that the running of limitation will not be postponed if defrauded
person may discover fraud from the public record, but when a fiduciary rela-
tionship is involved, no necessity exists for an examination of the records.
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have failed to record it. The purpose of such statutes can be perfectly
accomplished without giving them a collateral result which protects
fraud feasers from liability." WILLIAM EVANS.
Municipal Corporations-Liability for Extras Furnished With-
out Compliance with Statutory Mode of Contracting.-In Probst v.
City of Menasha, 45 Wis. 90, 13 N.W. (2d) 504 (1944) the defendant
city made contract with plaintiff contractor for the construction and re-
pair of sidewalk, which contract obligated the contractor to furnish
sufficient filling to bring subgrade to proper level. The contract was
entered into in compliance with Sec. 62.15' laying down the mode of
entering into municipal contracts for public works. However, at the
direction of the city engineer the contractor furnished extra filling of
sand, and a committee of the common council which worked with the
city engineer knew of the directions. It was held that the city could
make itself liable on contract only in compliance with statutory provi-
sions; that neither the city engineer nor the street committee had au-
thority to modify the terms of the contract between the contractor and
the city, and that the city did not become liable for the extra filling on
principle of unjust enrichment.
In L. G. Arnold Inc. v. City of Hudson,2 the plaintiff sought to re-
cover for additional work under an amended contract without addi-
tional compensation being included. In denying recovery the court said,
We have found no decision of this court in which it has been
held that a city may incur municipal liability by estoppel where
the applicable mandatory statutes have not been complied with.
The whole tenor of our decisions has been to require municipal
corporations implicitly to obey the law in regard to letting of con-
tracts or to incurring municipal liability and to deny to claim-
ants against municipalities recoveries unless the law relating to
the making of municipal contracts has been fully complied with.
Bechtold and another v. City of Wauwatosa and others,3 a taxpayers
action to enjoin the city from paying on a contract entered into with
the Federal Paving Corporation held that a municipality has no power
to make contracts for public improvements unless if proceeds in the
manner prescribed by law and that a contract entered into without com-
I WIs. STAT. (1915), Sec. 62.15(1). All public work the estimated cost of which
shall exceed $500 shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder; all
other public work shall be let as the council may direct. The council may also
by a vote of 2/3 of all the members elect provide by ordinance that any class
of public work or any part thereof may be done directly by the city without
submitting the same for bids.
2 L. G. Arnold Inc. v. City of Hudson, 215 Wis. 5, 254 N.W. 108 (19341.
3 Bechtold, and another v. City of Wauwatosa, and others, 228 Wis. 544, 227
N.W. 657 (1938).
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